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Cosmetic: Special Topic

Rhinosurgery during and after the COVID-19 Pandemic: International Consensus Conference Statement on Preliminary Perioperative Safety Measures

Haug, Martin D. M.D.; Lekakis, Garyfalia M.D.; Bussi, Mario M.D.; Cerkes, Nazim M.D.; Calvert, Jay M.D.; East, Charles M.D.; Gerbault, Olivier M.D.; Gubisch, Wolfgang M.D.; Heppt, Werner M.D.; Kamburoglu, Haldun M.D.; Most, Sam M.D.; Oranges, Carlo M. M.D., Ph.D.; Vavrina, Josef M.D.; Rohrich, Rod J. M.D.; Robotti, Enrico M.D.

Author Information
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery: May 2021 - Volume 147 - Issue 5 - p 1087-1095
doi: 10.1097/PRS.0000000000007868

Abstract

The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 is known to be responsible for the coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19).1,2 First detected in humans in Wuhan, Hubei Province, People’s Republic of China, in December of 2019, the infection has since rapidly spread globally.

It has been reported that 81 percent of all COVID-19 cases experience a mild or asymptomatic course of disease, 14 percent manifest a severe course, and 5 percent are in critical condition.3 The mortality rate in the total population ranges between 0.5 and 0.8 percent, whereas for the seasonal flu, the rate ranges from 0.1 to 0.2 percent.4 The incubation period is 3 to 14 days (mean, 5 to 7 days) for COVID-19 and 1 to 2 days for the seasonal flu, whereas the contagiousness is 5 to 6 days for COVID-19 and approximately 3 days for the seasonal flu.5,6

Symptoms such as fever, unproductive and dry cough, sore throat, and dyspnea in combination with a history of traveling in areas highly impacted by the pandemic orientate to a diagnosis of COVID-19.7 Symptoms develop slowly over the course of 3 to 5 days, in contrast to infection with the common cold and influenza, which present a sudden and intense feeling of illness. Olfactory disorders have been reported in up to two-thirds of patients as late symptoms, and are considered indicators of COVID-19 even without any other associated symptom.8

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 normally spreads by means of droplet infection, and the highest virus load and replication rate are registered in the upper respiratory tract mucosa of the pharynx and nasal cavity.9 Consequently, rhinosurgeons are considered to be particularly exposed to an increased risk of nosocomial infection, similar to otolaryngologists and ophthalmologists, who have been reported by the media as the groups with the highest mortality rates among medics in China.9–12 On these bases, the aim of the present international consensus conference was to address urgent questions regarding rhinosurgery during and after the COVID-19 pandemic and propose preliminary recommendations for clinical and surgical settings.

METHODS

The Science and Research Committee of the Rhinoplasty Society of Europe invited a group of its experts to participate to a Zoom Webinar together with selected international experts of The Rhinoplasty Society (Tables 1 and 2). Different medical specialties were represented. Before the Webinar, all participants received by e-mail a selection of key references derived from a systematic search process and 32 specific questions compiled on different topics to be presented during four conference sessions to generate a panel consensus. The first author (M.D.H.) created the final reference list based on the most recent evidence and relevance to the scope of the report.

Table 1. - Names and Countries of Panelists of Zoom Webinar
Surname. Given Name Surgical Discipline Country
Bussi, Mario Ear, nose, and throat Italy
Cerkes, Nazim Plastic, reconstructive, and aesthetic Turkey
Calvert, Jay Plastic, reconstructive, and aesthetic United States
East, Charles Ear, nose, and throat; facial plastic United Kingdom
Gerbault, Olivier Aesthetic France
Gubisch, Wolfgang Plastic, reconstructive, and aesthetic; ear, nose, and throat Germany
Haug, Martin Plastic, reconstructive, and aesthetic Switzerland
Heppt, Werner Ear, nose, and throat Germany
Kamburoglu, Haldun Plastic, reconstructive, and aesthetic; oral and maxillofacial Turkey
Lekakis, Garyfalia Ear, nose, and throat; facial plastic Belgium
Most, Sam Ear, nose, and throat; facial plastic United States
Robotti, Enrico Plastic, reconstructive, and aesthetic Italy
Rohrich, Rod J. Plastic, reconstructive, and aesthetic United States
Vavrina, Josef Ear, nose, and throat Switzerland

Table 2. - Characteristics of Panelists of the Zoom Webinar
Characteristic Value
Medical professionals 14
 Plastic, reconstructive, and aesthetic surgeons 7
 Ear, nose, and throat surgeons 7
 Facial plastic surgeon 2
 Oral and maxillofacial surgeon 1
 Aesthetic surgeon 1
Sex
 Female 1
 Male 13
Years of experience
 Mean 27
 Range 12–45
Estimated no. of rhinoplasty procedures performed or assisted in 2019
 20–100 0
 100–200 6
 ≥200 8
Affiliation
 Academic 9
 Public 1
 Private 11
 Public and private 7
Special guests 1
 Infectiologist 1

The panelists reviewed the set of questions, which were adjusted by the consensus chair (M.D.H.) according to the feedback received by iterative consultation over the weeks preceding the conference. The four sessions referred to the following topics: protection during consultation with patients; preoperative patient assessment; intraoperative measures to maximize safety and reduce risk of virus spreading; and legal aspects and problems. Each session was introduced by a quick summary of the key references if required by the members of the panel.

Between the sessions, keynote speakers discussed their local situation (San Francisco, Calif.; Dallas, Texas; Los Angeles, Calif.; Milan, Italy; and London, United Kingdom). The American experts of The Rhinoplasty Society reported on the measures and recommendations implemented in the United States. The presentations also included a keynote lecture about the efficacy of reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction and antibody testing and the testimony of a surgeon COVID-19 survivor.

After each session, an Internet-based electronic voting in the format “yes,” “no,” or “abstain” was conducted on each session-specific question. Abstaining was recommended in case of conflict of interest or if the wording of the question was not exactly expressing the ideas of the panel’s member.

After the conference, the results of the voting were translated into recommendations by the panel chair. Majority was defined by agreement among 50 to 75 percent of the panelists and consensus by agreement of more than 75 percent of the panelists. We did not follow strict guideline development standards and did not implement a formal Delphi process. However, the questions, answers, and discussions were contextualized within the current clinical evidence in the form of a conference report, which was circulated among participants in an iterative open e-mail process until agreement was reached.

RESULTS

Protection during Consultation with Patients

Session 1 illustrates the results of the voting on protection measures during consultation with patients. (See Appendix, Supplemental Digital Content 1, which shows panelists’ question-and-answer results, http://links.lww.com/PRS/E420.)

Separate COVID-19 Areas

There was a majority among the panelists in favor of the creation of separate COVID-19 areas in private practice, although consensus could not be reached.

Masks in Private Practice

The majority of the panelists agreed that the safety in a private practice setting is effectively guaranteed by standard surgical masks and shield (type II, IIR, FFP1). A stronger majority agreed that FFP2/FFP3/N95 mask and shield may be necessary.

Air-Purifying Systems

The majority of the panelists believe that air-purifying systems (standard air cleaners; air purifiers or air sanitizers; and heating, ventilation, and air conditioning filters) are not helpful.

Increased Air Flow Turnover

Increased air flow turnover should be provided according to 73 percent of the panelists.

Disinfection Measures

The majority of the panelists stated that the use of ultraviolet type C is not helpful in disinfecting high-touch surfaces, whereas there was consensus on considering sufficient standard disinfection of high-touch surfaces after every patient. The combination of ultraviolet type C plus standard disinfection seems not to be purposeful and necessary to improve safety in a private practice setting for most of the panelists (majority). Table 3 illustrates the protection measures during consultation with patients and recommendations.

Table 3. - Recommendations for Protection during Consultation with Patients
Question Recommendation
Separate COVID-19 areas Not a must, but would be helpful, especially in private practice with high-risk patients and/or maneuvers
Masks in private practice Masks with filter standard FFP1 for patients and health care workers at any time; in high-risk patients and maneuvers, FFP2, FFP3, or N95 is recommended
 Standard surgical masks (FFP1)
 FFP2, FFP3, and N95
Air-purifying systems Not a must, but in high-risk patients and aerosol-producing maneuvers, separate rooms are recommended
Increased air flow turnover Strongly recommended
Disinfection measures Consensus recommendation on standard disinfection of high-touch surfaces after each patient; UV-C may be carried out as well
 UV-C
 Standard disinfection
 UV-C and standard disinfection
UV-C, ultraviolet type C.

Patient Assessment Preoperatively in Patients with No COVID-19 Symptoms

Session 2 illustrates the results of the voting on protection measures during patient assessment preoperatively (see Appendix, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/PRS/E420).

Informed Consent

Consensus could be reached concerning the necessity to adapt medical history collection to include specific COVID-19–focused questions.

Performing Rhinoplasty

The majority of the panelists agreed that it is at the moment appropriate to perform aesthetic rhinoplasties. However, 36 percent of the panelists were concerned about conducting elective rhinosurgery. In contrast, consensus could be reached in favor of performing functional rhinoplasties.

Patient Testing

The totality of the panelists supported the implementation of real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction testing as part of the preoperative routine (100 percent yes). The majority believed that this has to be carried out 2 days before the operation, 57.1 percent recommended that this be performed as close to surgery as feasible, and only 21 percent believed that this has to be carried out 4 days before the operation.

The majority of the panelists agreed not to carry out real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction testing twice within 5 days preoperatively, and the panelists strongly felt that preoperative self-quarantine should be requested (majority). Consensus could be reached regarding the fact that antibody tests are currently not useful or reliable. Table 4 illustrates patient assessment preoperatively and recommendations.

Table 4. - Recommendations for Patient Assessment Preoperatively in Patients without COVID-19 Symptoms
Question Recommendation
Adaption of informed consent Consensus recommendation to adapt patient informed consent to the special COVID-19 situation
Performing rhinoplasty Consensus recommendation that functional rhinoplasty can be performed given that personal protective equipment in the OR is adequately used
 Aesthetic rhinoplasty
 Functional rhinoplasty
Patient testing Consensus recommendation to routinely perform RT-PCR tests before surgery; testing is recommended to take place 2 days before rhinoplasty; and antibody testing two times is not recommended
 One-time RT-PCR routinely
  As close to surgery as feasible
  2 days before surgery
  4 days before surgery
  Two times in-between 5 days before surgery
 Antibody testing
Preoperative quarantine Recommendation to request self-quarantine preoperatively for 5–7 days
OR, operating room; RT-PCR, real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction.

Intraoperative (COVID-19–Negative Patients, No Children)

Session 3 illustrates the results of the voting on safety measures intraoperatively (see Appendix, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/PRS/E420).

Antiseptic Packing

The panel reached consensus on the need to use antiseptic packing before surgery with Octenisept (Schülke & Mayr GmbH, Norderstedt, Germany) or povidone-iodine (Betadine; Purdue Pharma, Stamford, Conn.) or any other suitable disinfectant in addition to intranasal and pharynx disinfection.

Masks and Respirators in the Operating Room

Concerning the different available masks and respirators intraoperatively, the panelists agreed that standard surgical masks plus shields for the rhinosurgeon are not safe enough (consensus), whereas FFP2/3/N95 respirators plus shields should be used (consensus).

Power Instruments and Piezo

A strong majority recommended not using power instruments and Piezo as usually done, although consensus could not be reached because of a remarkable rate of abstentions. In contrast, the panelists agreed on not prohibiting power instruments and Piezo in all types of rhinoplasty maneuvers (consensus). A strong majority agreed that there is no higher risk of virus spread when using powered instruments and Piezo without touching the mucosa.

Laminar Air Flow

A strong majority stated that laminar air flow protects the surgeons and his or her staff in a better way.

Nasal Packing

There was disagreement about the appropriateness of performing nasal packing. Table 5 illustrates intraoperative measures and recommendations.

Table 5. - Intraoperative Recommendations for COVID-19–Negative Patients*
Question Recommendation
Antiseptic packing before surgery Consensus recommendation to perform antiseptic packing before surgery and intranasal and pharynx disinfection
Intranasal and pharynx disinfection
Masks and respirators in OR Consensus recommendation not to use standard surgical masks plus shield alone; consensus recommendation to use FFP2, FFP3, or N95 respirator plus shield during rhinoplasty
 Standard surgical mask plus shield
 FFP2, FFP3; N95 plus shield
Power instruments and Piezo Strong recommendation not to use power instruments and Piezo as usual; consensus recommendation not to prohibit power instruments and Piezo; recommendation that power instruments and Piezo may be used in a differentiated way in simple bone maneuvers if no extensive mucosal defect is present
 Not to be used as usual
 Prohibition
 Higher risk for aerosolization if mucosa is touched
Laminar air flow Strong recommendation for laminar air flow; if possible, negative-pressure airflow with exchange of complete air volume in the OR one time per minute
Nasal packing No recommendation
OR, operating room.
*No children.

Legal Aspects and Problems

Session 4 illustrates the results of the voting on handling legal aspects and problems in COVID-19 pandemic (see Appendix, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/PRS/E420).

Complication Rate/Deaths

The panelists strongly agreed that patients with undetected COVID-19 have a higher rate of complications and death after surgery (consensus).

Surgeon’s Responsibility

There was a controversial discussion of whether the surgeon is responsible for patients while undergoing rhinoplasty. In this case, the panelists believed that this should be considered a complication (consensus) rather than malpractice (majority).

Resuming Elective Rhinosurgery

There was again disagreement regarding the appropriateness of resuming elective surgery.

Adaptation of Informed Consent

There was consensus regarding the need for adapting the informed consent to the specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Table 6 illustrates legal aspects, problems, and recommendations.

Table 6. - Legal Aspects, Problems, and Recommendations
Question Recommendation
Are complication rate/deaths in undetected COVID-19 patients higher? Consensus
Surgeon’s responsibility Consensus that cross-infection with COVID-19 while undergoing rhinoplasty is a complication; consensus recommendation to adapt patient informed consent in terms of this
 Patient getting infected with COVID-19 while undergoing rhinoplasty
 Complication
 Malpractice
Resuming elective rhinosurgery Recommendation not to resume elective rhinosurgery; indications should be critically reviewed, and in case of doubt, operation should be postponed

DISCUSSION

Epidemiologic studies revealed that one of the reasons for the dramatic spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 virus is the relatively mild onset or no symptoms within a period of high contagiousness up to 3 days.13 General agreement exists that it is of utmost importance to secure the safety of patients and health care workers while returning to normal clinical activities in public/academic hospitals and private practice. A multitude of recommendations have been issued globally and published in the medical literature.14–18

Session 1 focused on how to reduce the risk of cross-infection between patients and private practice health care workers. The majority of the panelists recommended segregation of patients into different risk groups physically separated in distinct areas.19 This safety measure must be reasonably adapted to the specific characteristics of each private practice according to the number of high-risk patients and maneuvers.

The majority of the panelists agreed to recommend standard surgical masks plus shield (type II, IIR, FFP1) for patients and health care workers, if a safety distance of 1.5 m is impossible. In case of aerosol-generating examinations/procedures or patients with COVID-19–specific symptoms, if the consultation cannot be postponed, respirators (FFP2, FFP3, or N95) and shields should be compulsory. This is in line with the recommendations of the Robert Koch Institute, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, and the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.20

Increased airflow turnover should be provided according to 73 percent of the panelists to keep airborne contamination as low as possible.21 Continuous disinfection of high-touch surfaces is necessary after each patient’s contact. A majority of the panelists found ultraviolet type C not helpful, whereas there was a consensus on performing standard disinfection of high-touch surfaces after every patient. Combination of ultraviolet type C and standard disinfection was rejected by the majority of the panelists. Strict adherence to basic standard hygiene measures offers considerable protection during short contact periods with symptomatic COVID-19 cases by diminishing the risk of direct and indirect transmission.22

The current situation still requires reduction of activities in the outpatient clinic to reduce the risk of cross-infection, particularly of elderly patients and patients with comorbidities. Telephone or video consultations should be offered whenever possible. The private practitioner has to be aware that these logistic and workflow changes are likely to be necessary for a longer period.

Session 2 dealt with preoperative patient assessments, highlighting the necessity of investigating specific symptoms related to COVID-19. Fever, unproductive and dry cough, sore throat, and dyspnea in combination with a history of traveling in areas affected by the COVID-19 pandemic should always be screened for. If positive, this is highly indicative of COVID-19.7

Moreover, validated real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction tests should be performed. A positive real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 confirms the diagnosis in the vast majority of cases, although false-positive results have been reported.7,23 There are more than 500 polymerase chain reaction tests on the market focusing on different target sequences of the virus RNA, such as E-gen, N-gen, Envelope-(E), Orf-gen, or M-gen.24,25 Multilocular swabs are recommended to avoid false-negative results.5,26 In case of advanced disease requiring intensive care, a bronchoalveolar lavage is necessary.

As a real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction test turns positive 1 to 2 days before clinical symptoms,27 a strong majority of the panel recommend carrying out one-time–only, real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction testing in all patients 2 days before surgery. A strong majority rejected the repetition of two tests over 5 preoperative days. Although consensus could not be reached, the panelists strongly advised requesting a preoperative self-quarantine.

Antibody tests that are available on the market screen for antibodies class immunoglobulin A, immunoglobulin M, and immunoglobulin G. These antibodies format immune response by attacking structural proteins of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (S1 and S2 domains of protein S and protein N). Finally, to the authors’ knowledge, the Cobas severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 is a CE-IVD–marked, real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction test and is the only antibody test validated for qualitative detection of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 nuclide acid.

False-positive antibody tests are quite common because of cross-reaction with other coronaviruses such as human coronavirus OC43, human coronavirus HKU1, and others. Consensus was reached on not recommending the use of antibody tests.

The majority of the panelists agreed that performing aesthetic rhinoplasty in the present moment is a critical decision, although it may be acceptable if the use of personal protective equipment in the operating room is implemented in the most appropriate way. However, the panelists agreed on restarting functional rhinosurgery without restrictions even if the operation would simultaneously address aesthetic issues.

Session 3 focused on the operating room. Rhinosurgeons are at uniquely high risk for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 exposure before, during, and after surgery, as viral particles have been found in nasal swabs, pharyngeal swabs, sputum, and bronchial swabs.25,28 Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 spreads by means of droplet infection and can survive for days on multiple surfaces, including plastic and stainless steel.28 It has to be assumed that the entire operating room will be potentially contaminated while performing rhinosurgery.

If any maneuver or manipulation leads to aerosolization or the virus becomes airborne, the risk of virus spread and contagion increases because of extensive environmental contamination in a negative-pressure room.28,29 Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 is able to remain viable in aerosols for 3 hours.28

The panel discussed how to lower virus load and dissemination in the operating room and how to use personal protective equipment. According to the panel consensus, antiseptic packing with povidone-iodine and intranasal and pharynx disinfection before surgery are recommended. Kariwa et al. and Harbison and Hammer found that exposure of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 1 and human immunodeficiency, respectively, to povidone-iodine products for 2 minutes reduces virus infectivity below the detectable level.30,31

The panelists agreed that standard surgical masks plus shields do not provide enough intraoperative protection, and consensus could be reached to recommend the use of FFP2, FFP3, and N95 respirators plus shields. Transmission is directly influenced by particle size. Small particles in airborne transmission have a diameter of approximately 5 μm or less, whereas droplets involving larger aerosols can be as large as 100 μm.32 There are different masks protecting against droplets and airborne transmission. N95 respirators fulfill the filtering efficiency criteria set by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health N95 standard, filtering 95 percent of large droplets and aerosols down to 0.3 μm. FFP1, FFP2, and FFP3 are European standards (EN 149:2001), with FFP2 comparable to N95 standard.33,34 In high-risk situations (e.g., virus aerosol environment), the World Health Organization and U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommend the use of respirators meeting N95, FFP2, and FFP3 standards.35,36

A strong majority agreed on not using power instruments and Piezo as usual. This orientation is confirmed by different authors. Workman et al. recommended that different drill-based procedures in the nasal cavity and skull base be reclassified as “aerosol-generating operations.”32 Personal protective equipment protocols should reflect the unique dangers of aerosol-based infectious transmission to the operating room’s team in this case.37

However, the panelists reached consensus on not always prohibiting power instruments and Piezo. A strong majority found that there is no higher risk of virus aerosolization if power instruments and Piezo are not used. Although there is no evidence concerning aerosolization of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, cold instruments should be used whenever possible.

Again, a strong majority believes that laminar air flow better protects surgeons and staff. Contamination of adjacent operating rooms and hallways in proximity to the affected operating room have been reported by different authors; therefore, negative-pressure airflow is recommended.38 When negative-pressure rooms are unavailable, sufficient time has to be ensured between cases to allow complete room air exchange (30 minutes).39

Session 4 examined legal aspects. These recommendations cannot be universally valid because of different legal regulations in different countries. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to agree on basic and general principles.

The panelists strongly agreed that patients with undetected COVID-19 are exposed to higher rates of complications and death during and after surgery. This is consistent with a Chinese study conducted in Wuhan: 15 of 34 patients (44.1 percent) undergoing elective surgery during the incubation period of COVID-19 needed an intensive care unit, and mortality equaled 20.5 percent (seven patients).4 The findings were compared with the data of the current literature and explained with the ability of anesthetic drugs, surgical stress, hypotension, hypothermia, pain, blood transfusion, and hyperglycemia to impair immune functions.3,40–44

However, the patients should receive all relevant information about the risks of contracting COVID-19 during surgery and this should be clearly documented. A strong majority agreed to modify the informed consent accordingly. The panelists did not agree that the surgeon is responsible for infections contracted during rhinoplasty, which should be considered as a complication if sufficient safety measures in line with local health authority guidelines have been implemented.

There was disagreement on whether to resume elective surgery now is appropriate or not. Despite the differences between countries and health systems, it is generally recommended to postpone elective operations until after the crisis.45–47 In most countries, COVID-19 is in its plateau stage, and surgeons and health systems are planning to resume these types of operations. The American College of Surgeons, the American Society of Anesthesiologists, the Association of Perioperative Registered Nurses, and the American Hospital Association recommended restarting elective operations after a sustained reduction in the rate of new COVID-19 cases in a given geographic area for at least 14 days, after authorization by the municipal, county, and state health authorities.48

Appropriate numbers of intensive care unit and non–intensive care unit beds, personal protective equipment, ventilators, medications, anesthetics, medical surgical supplies, and trained staff must be available. However, there is no clear indication regarding elective surgery. Resumption is a local/regional decision. Conversely, “semielective” operations, defined as “medically necessary, time-sensitive procedures,” are recommended.49

Thus, is it worth to take the risk of performing an operation? To answer, we may refer to the Medically Necessary Time-Sensitive Prioritization score of septoplasties, recently generated, to balance risk and timing of operations by using the micromort concept, introduced by Howard in 1980.49,50 This terminology defines the risk of death with a one-in-a-million chance (e.g., operating on an American Society of Anesthesiologists class I patient under general anesthesia equals 4 micromort, which means that the risk of dying is four in 1 million).51,52 Nearly zero risk should therefore correspond to no severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2–positive case in a country for at least 14 days, assuming that the “14 days concept” is accepted as standard.53 This means that if there are 20 positive patients in a country with a population of 1 million, the risk equals operating on American Society of Anesthesiologists class I patients in normal conditions.

In fact, the problem is local-specific and the risk differs between all countries. After health authorities’ approval of elective operations restart, each surgeon should weigh the risk of resuming the operations.

CONCLUSIONS

Even though there are no randomized controlled trials for several of the presented points, there is an increasingly large body of observational evidence that consistently indicates that implementation of a defined catalogue of measures into a private practice setting and in public hospitals, as compiled by the panelists during the consensus conference, is of utmost importance to protect health care workers and patients during the COVID-19 pandemic. As the level of knowledge is rapidly changing, the topic requires reevaluation in approximately 6 months’ time (see Appendix, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/PRS/E420).

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