To analyze key variations in the after action report/improvement plan (AAR/IP) process used by state and local health departments following the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and identify ideas for improving that process.
Workshop participants discussed their AAR findings and the methods used to prepare their reports and implications for improving the AAR/IP process in future events.
Workshop participants included state and local health department personnel who had submitted AAR/IPs to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for review.
Workshop participants were asked to consider the question: On the basis of what you heard in this workshop, what would you do differently if you could redo your 2009 H1N1 AAR/IP?
Workshop discussions revealed wide differences in the participants' understanding of the intended uses and users of the AAR/IPs, their scope, timing, and format, and the use of external consultants in their preparation, and on the strengths and weaknesses of various approaches. The AAR/IPs also varied in the extent to which they sought to identify root causes and the methods they used to do so.
The AAR/IPs can be useful for both accountability and quality improvement, but these objectives require different foci and methodological approaches. Notably, the AAR/IPs can also be used as an opportunity to hold health departments accountable for conducting root cause analyses and making the improvements that follow from them. Federal agencies requiring the AAR/IPs should clarify the purpose and issues of scope and timing; develop training materials and exemplary cases of effective AAR/IPs, particularly of root cause analysis applied to public health emergency preparedness, professional guidelines, and standards for consultants; and consider developing a peer model for preparing AAR/IPs.
The objective of this study was to analyze key variations in the after action report/improvement plan process used by state and local health departments following the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and identify ideas for improving that process.
Department of Health Systems Administration, Georgetown University School of Nursing & Health Studies, Washington, District of Columbia (Dr Stoto and Mr Kraemer); RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California (Dr Nelson); Harvard School of Public Health, Boston, Massachusetts (Ms Higdon); O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, District of Columbia (Mr Kraemer); and Division of State and Local Readiness, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia (Dr Singleton).
Correspondence: Michael A. Stoto, PhD, Department of Health Systems Administration, Georgetown University School of Nursing & Health Studies, 3700 Reservoir Rd, NW, Room 236, Washington, DC 20057 (email@example.com).
This article was developed with funding support awarded to the Harvard School of Public Health under cooperative agreements with the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) grant number 5P01TP000307-01.
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the CDC.